[Rick Gunnell] You're listening to CLSC Dialogues, landpower in the Indo-Pacific, a China Landpower Studies Center production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of Army, US Army, War College, or any other agency of the US government. I'm Rick Gunnel, research professor of China military studies and today we're talking with Josh Arostegui, chair of the China Landpower Studies Center, and Brennan Devereaux, national security researcher at the Strategic Studies Institute.

Today, we'll be chatting about the recently published monograph More Than a Numbers Game: Comparing US and Chinese Landpower in the Pacific Requires Context. I'll start with an opening question. How did you become interested in this topic, and how did it evolve over time?

[Joshua Arostegui] Well, I'll jump on this one first. So, this was essentially a direct result of a visit from senior leaders from the US Army Pacific. When our center first stood up. It was more of an ask for us to get after, you know, assessing or analyzing, you know, how US Army campaigning in the Indo-Pacific was working? Maybe describe a little bit more in detail and potentially look at measures of effectiveness, you know, against adversaries.

I'm a China guy, you know, I like to research China stuff. While I worked for the Army for many years, it was one of those topics that I said, well, I'll give it a shot. And, as I did it, I realized I knew a lot more about China than I knew about the US Army. And so, after I wrote my first couple drafts, I was a little disappointed with how they turned out. And I went to the office next door and talked to Brennan and say, “Hey, Brennan, what do you think?” And he gave me some great ideas about potentially creating a more of a comparative analysis with how the PLA and its army, in the Indo-Pacific, was posturing and modernizing and use that as essentially a foundation to compare both sides.

And as I started to write this, I said, wow, this is a really great idea. I also realized I still don't know as much about the US Army as I should. “Hey, Brennan, do you want to help out with this one?” And, honestly, him coming on board the project, you know, me co-opting his assistance made this really, a far better project. Brennan?

[Brennan Deveraux] Yeah. So, I took from where Josh chose, and we kind of looked at this big restructure with the comparison between the forces. And one thing that drove that is there's this old Navy PowerPoint slide that both of us had seen - a lot of people who have looked at future war have seen - where it's, it pretty much that the bottom line in it is look how many ships China has. Isn't that terrifying? Which “yes…but” was always kind of the conversation. And as we transition that to landpower, it's really important because these systems, while still very important, are less the foundation of what that power is. So, it's important to know how many tanks someone has. But there's more to how tanks are employed than just how many ships someone has.

And so we use that kind of as their foundation to say, don't do that. Don't just compare like items and say, “oh my gosh, we're doomed because they have more people.” Because they do. They have more people. They'll continue to have more people. And if they want, they'll continue to have a bigger army. And what we did is we started with kind of this shorter commentary piece, that really argued more of that, which was, you know, we got to make sure as we're doing these assessments that we don't fall into that trap because it's such an easy trap for analysis.

But that really also, similar to the first draft Josh did, it really didn't pan out. Because that foundational knowledge wasn't really there. So, we switched from commentary to actual hard analysis to kind of provide some of that framework that says, you know, there is context between and here are some of the things we need to measure. And as we started getting into those things that we thought we needed to identify, you know, those big picture things, the length really got away from us. And we turned it from, you know, what was initially asked, hey, can you help us with a short commentary piece to a medium commentary piece to medium analysis and what it ended up with is the standalone monograph I think we're happy with. I don't think we could have went shorter and got the analysis in. And if we want too much longer, I think we would have deterred some readers with a little too long, don't read.

[Rick Gunnell] Great. So, let's dive into it. Tell me about the five features of landpower you chose to assess. How did you pick them and was anything left out you wish you could have added?

[Brennan Deveraux] So, I'll go first on this one. So, we started really big picture. Like what are the defining categories that is landpower? And so, there's a ton of options with this. But our initial like I said, when we were just doing that commentary, we just picked three and we said, what? What does each nation think about when they say landpower? What are the definitions of landpower? Right. We can hopefully find those in a book and pull them out, compare and contrast and find those little differences, because that's the foundation of what we're talking about.

The second, really fit into kind of how they each nation understands warfare. When we talk about how landpower is used as a tool to build relationships, and that's very easy in the blue hat. And that's where we expect to find the most differences between red and blue.

And then that third one was how are they simulating warfare? Right. How are the nations looking at how landpower is actually going to be used in a conflict? Because that's what that simulation of warfare is.

As the product developed, as I said, we really wanted to get deeper into the analysis. We added two more, that, again, were very big picture. They were foundational to what we think landpower is, what we think landpower is going to do and how we want to shape it. Which was the next two underlying warfare concepts, you know, what do they think about, future war will be? And then the corresponding modernization efforts, if future war is going to be X, how do I get my force to be there, you know, when that war comes?

[Joshua Arostegui] Yeah. I mean, that's spot on. You know, the first two or the two topics about, you know, campaigning in the Indo-Pacific and relationship building, you know, training, I should say, and relationship building really were kind of easy. Those were big. Those are big primary missions for US Army Pacific. You know, where, you know, the Chinese don't openly discuss a lot of these topics, you know, especially the relationship building. They're very anti-alliances. And, while they work, you know, abroad with partners are bringing partners, you know, into the country to do some training. It's not to the same extent that we do, we being the US, do with our partners and allies.

Right. So, it was easy to at least touch on those kinds of topics. But when you get into the landpower thing, that was that was a bit more problematic. Right? And, so when Brennan said, hey, we should really create this kind of defined definition, I should say of, of landpower, you know, it's a lot easier for the US Army because we publish it openly. Right? So, you read Army Doctrine and ADP 3-0, operations, and it talks about what landpower is. Guess what the PLA does not do: publish those types of things openly.

So, I had to essentially dig through years of, you know, PLA textbooks and operational art in Chinese to dig out, you know, their concepts and they don't really get after that. It's not a topic that they clearly define. Instead, they like to talk about, you know, domain control. So they'll say, you know, we control this, the land domain. And we'll control the sea domain or the maritime domain and the air domain, which is somewhat roughly equivalent. But instead they also focus on, you know, service strategies like the Army's, you know, responsibilities and their strategies are such and such and such. So what I did was I had to kind of, you know, combine all this into finding a best answer. It was not easy. And I think but I think it did provide a great foundation, you know, for the product.

But, you know, getting after the other ones, like modernization. I've written a lot of modernization over the years. It's a it's a big topic that I think people need to understand because when you see the news about Chinese, you know, military modernization, you're oftentimes seeing things like the Renhai cruiser or, you know, the fifth, potential sixth generation aircraft and that kind of stuff that are being out or, fielded to the force.

You really don't see much of the news about, you know, the large numbers of air defense or advanced air defense systems that the Army's fielding and light high mobility systems that are, you know, enable power projection. You don't see that in the news as often, despite the fact that they come out just as regularly as other new systems. So, I thought that was a really a fun way to go about that one.

But the operational concept one, I'll just touch on this briefly, was a topic that I've been kind of tracking, all domain operations, and we'll probably get in this a little later, most likely. But, you know, it was neat to see the comparison between the two because, you know, the Army was tasked with developing this all-domains operations concept by XI Jinping in 2017, which, miraculously, you know, aligns with when the US Army was tasked with developing multi-domain battle. It's, there's a lot of similarities there. So, it made it a pretty easy, set of reasons why we chose those five questions. Or those five topics on landpower and, we went forward with that.

[Brennan Deveraux] Yeah. And there could have been more. We explored the ideas of, you know, kind of continuing it out. One of the biggest challenges, first, was capability on my end. I had to be able to explain in detail the same way a US look at a problem set. And then also sometimes that just didn't bump up, as we looked at, analyzing something through the PLA lens and the US lens, it really just didn't mesh well. And we didn't want to overextend our analysis. So, I felt good with kind of calling it at the five, because that really allowed us to pull the thread on some ideas.

[Joshua Arostegui] Yeah, I agree, the, there could been a whole lot more. We wrote on command and control in the region, right. You know, the plays, theater army concepts. Getting into, you know, senior leader, you know, development in the Army, especially those who are taking charge of ground forces in the Indo-Pacific. So, there's a lot that it would have just made this probably a book instead. And maybe that's something for the future. We'll see. But yeah, we had to cut it off somewhere and I think we, we did, we made the right choice.

[Rick Gunnell] Great, and reading it, I think one of the most stark differences that I saw, was in that relationship building and using landpower to develop relationships as the PLA goes global or at least tries to go global, they need to look for allies and partners. But you note in the monograph that the last time the PLA hosted a large-scale multinational event at one of the major PLA training centers was in 2014, kind of emphasizing this idea that the army, the PLA Army, does not appear to emphasize relationship building using complex integrated exercises with other partner nations in comparison to us.

So, I guess that begs the question. We see differences, but there's also a lot of similarities that, you know, between the US Army and the PLA Army. Can you highlight some key similarities and speculate as to why that is the case?

[Joshua Arostegui] You know, there were a lot of, differences, like when you look at the definitions of landpower and, and, you know, and how they build partners and, you know, build partnerships. You know, the big thing I, you call the 2014 event, that was a unique one. There have still been numerous exercises and training with partners like Russia, particularly in areas like Western theater and other regions, that have happened since, but not to the same extent that, you know, the US Army does its own types of partnership building and major exercises in the theater.

When it comes to similarities, I think the big one I noticed really was modernization. You know, as I mentioned, the PLA is, the army itself, is fielding large amounts of really high tech systems, especially those related to a long-range strike, you know, tactical air defense. These are all things that, you know, people kind of hand-wave. But I think it's important to recognize that China views the army as the key to victory in any kind of future conflict. They write in their own texts, as in their own media, like, hey, the army is what wins the wars. You know, you have to secure the land to win the war. And they believe doing so requires, you know, this huge influx of modern equipment.

And what I, what I think is interesting is because, you know, there are so many people who like to quote Unrestricted Warfare and other types of text where it's like, hey, no, China doesn't want to go toe to toe with us. They want to go asymmetric for whatever reasons. I'd argue that the modernization efforts that are happening in Indo-Pacific, particularly with the Army, demonstrate the polar opposite of that. They are they are building a capability to go toe-to-toe with major modern militaries. So, I thought that was a very big similarity.

But then also the similarities when it comes to operational concepts, you know, our version of the multi-domain battle and multi-domain operations and joint all domain operations and their version of all domain operations. Amazingly similar. Surprise, surprise, they like to read our stuff right?

[Brennan Deveraux] Yeah, as Josh kind of alludes to, I think that the similarities were the most interesting aspect of the research. And they continue to kind of drive the analysis. And then set up at the end, really, some questions for further analysis. So, that it's easy to say, you know, when I was kind of the going in assumption that there's going to be these huge, stark differences. And we knew that with building relationships. But those similarities, I think, set up that future research that you kind of alluded to earlier with, leadership, you know, how are decisions being made? Some things that have to get into the weeds to really understand what the differences are because at the surface level, they seem very similar.

Two, two jumped out of me. One I'll touch briefly on was jointness. This idea that, and I think the reason these two both kind of stood out to me is because they kind of challenge this US assumption of superiority. It's like, well, we're joint and we're well trained, so we're the best. And I do think we're the best. I proudly wear the uniform, you know, like, we're doing great things, but this idea that other nations aren't doing that is something we need to be aware of. And the jointness, for the PLA side, it was very much, something talked about, and I think for future research might be something we need to understand how much it's actually employed versus how much it's canned and scripted and just emphasized. So, I found that interesting.

But the one that really was eye opening to me, and me and Josh talked a lot about, was this idea of simulating training with opposing forces or OPFOR, and I know this is something that the West I mean, we have been pushing for generations, and it's not just the US military. So we have, you know, we have training centers, combat training centers in the United States, the National Training center, Joint Readiness Training Center that have been pushing the Army forces through for a long time. We also have, forward, training centers to work with our allies in NATO and recently have even started doing this in the Pacific. This in our eyes is a big win. And it is.

What was really surprising to me is how much China has started to invest in that as well. So, they have training centers, you know, across, the mainland, and different levels of capability with it, of course. But a recent emphasis on opposing forces, so some organic opposing forces, some, you know, internal to the organization, the unit itself, providing opposing forces. And then even a little bit of the joint as they're looking at training some of those potential future air defenders coordinating with the PLA Air Force to enable that training.

I found that really interesting. And it was one of those things that made me take a step back, and say, I think that our militaries might be even though there's so many cultural differences, they might be more similar than we give it credit.

[Joshua Arostegui] And I think it's necessary to, you know, relate that the Chinese learn from us. I mean, they have studied our own opposing force capabilities and the way we run, you know, Fort Irwin in California, in the development of their own, you know, Zhurihe Joint Training Base, which was their first really big OPFOR for large scale maneuver, or at least brigade level maneuver operations.

But over the past, as Brennan mentioned, over the past few years, we've seen this real big uptick in, you know, training bases in different environments. And so just as we, you know, the US Army Pacific have, you know, training capabilities to train in jungle, in mountain, and in Arctic, and everything else, the Chinese have their own way of doing it, too, because you know, when you look at geography, you know, China's borders are, China's country itself is filled with every type of terrain possible. You know, south you have the jungle mountain terrain and the east you have amphibious, you know, littorals regions, you know, north, very cold, plains. You know, in the west, you have the highest elevations in the world and plateau and desert terrains. And so, the Chinese are recognizing that they're gonna have to operate in any one of these in the future.

And so, I think it's neat that they have taken this, you know, the OPFOR thing very seriously. And I wanted to take the chance to say, you know, people oftentimes go, oh, they're just, their OPFOR for is just simulating U.S capabilities. And it's like, no, no, it's really not. It's the OPFOR is very similar to how we do it where it's you create a world class OPFOR in a sense where you're just, you're trying to make it really hard on those, you know, PLA Army commanders to, to win, which they almost never do. And you're going to learn lessons from it. And if, if they're doing really well, guess what, they can probably turn the difficulty up even more. And so, this is what they're training on. And I think it's important for people to understand that.

[Rick Gunnell] That's great. And it reminds me of two pieces that the PLA really looks at consistently. One, they constantly talk about studying a strong adversary, and that could be the US, or it could be other conflicts that they might find themselves in, including along the Line of Actual Control with India. It is also about the emphasis on realism that the PLA really has taken a strong look at and realized that it's a missing link in their capabilities. And so, the ability to train and all these different types of environments in a very real setting, they believe that that will truly help them grow into a world-class force.

So, thinking over the next 5 to 10 years, where might the US Army develop asymmetric advantages over China and maybe even vice versa?

[Brennan Deveraux] So, right along with how we kind of divided and conquered the research and writing, I guess I'll take the shot at the US advantage. And I really want to focus on the a word you said in there, the asymmetric advantage or the relative advantage. So, yes, we should keep modernizing our forces and build new equipment. But as we identified, China is doing the same thing. So, building that new awesome rocket launcher, necessary. But it's not going to give us that asymmetric advantage. They're going to have the same stuff.

For me, it's this concept of institutional trust. And I'll highlight a couple of things about that real quick. So first, this rise in technological capabilities that, you know, pushes for this asymmetric battlefield that gives all these capabilities down to the lowest level or up to the senior level. It actually plays this kind of double edged sword as we're looking at conflicts in Ukraine and Nagorno-Karabakh, where, there is the capability of a small unit forward to have what could be considered strategic level capabilities, or at a minimum, the capabilities to allow them to have a strategic impact on the battlefield. At the same time, there is the capability with these systems to draw that control back up to allow a two-star, three-star general, to watch that squad leader and ask why he's turning left instead of right.

And so, with that balance, I think the United States, just how we culturally do business, has the potential to create an asymmetric advantage by really pushing institutional trust. And I think that that happens over three different kinds of avenues, because I think the easy-button answer is to say, we'll just decentralize and give all the authorities to the lowest level. And, well, that doesn't work either. For lots of reasons. But I do think the first aspect of that is, we have a good understanding of what we can push down, what can be down at the lowest level. That is training. That's doctrine, to be able to trust the lowest level fighting element to use these systems and really shape the battlefield.

And there's a lot that goes into that. We already have the institutional trust to know that the soldiers will, you know, fix bayonets and charge the hill if you need them to. And we have the institutional trust going back that says, you know, food will show up at some time. Right. But adding in that layer of, hey, the soldier on the ground will get the capabilities they need to do the job, and we trust them to understand the battlefield, to be trained on these systems, to really make a difference, and execute when they can't communicate or there's not time to communicate because the battle is so fast.

At the same time, I think that, for the second point of the three, the that institutional trust has to go back up, there has to be this understanding that there's things that need to be retained at higher levels for impact on the battlefield, for authority reasons, for, you know, potential horizontal escalation, whatever it is. Think of offensive cyber capabilities. You know, maybe the squad isn't doing offensive cyber on a nation's infrastructure. Right.

And as we're coming out of the global war on terrorism era, where these brigade combat teams really were these autonomous units with all the capabilities they needed, I think that there'll be kind of a hard cultural look to say, you know, maybe I don't need that capability because I trust that the joint task force is going to provide that for me, in some way, shape or form.

And then the one wrinkle on top of all that, that I don't think is talked about a lot, and I know there are some people in the conversation, is what are we willing to trust humans to not have to do anymore? As we look at technology outsourcing some aspect of the battlefield, where can we invest the best in technology to enable us not just by letting us make decisions faster, but by taking some of those decisions off our plate? Can we do autonomous resupply? Can we do some autonomous evacuations? And then the real controversial one that I also study is can we do any sort of autonomous lethality?

And I think if we pursue trust and those kind of three areas, what can we push down? What do we expect higher to support with, and then what can we outsource off of our plate? I think we could really look at how we could dynamically fight on the battlefield, where we might be numerically outmatched, but we're able to do these things better, faster, and more efficiently.

[Joshua Arostegui] You know, this topic itself could have been a whole other part of the monograph or other chapter, you know, because when you look at, institutional, you know, trust, this is a big difference between the PLA and the US military, right? The PLA doesn't have a whole lot of institutional trust. That's why it pushes down political officers down to company level, you know, up and down the chain of command. So, the issue with mission command is going to continue to plague the PLA in a lot of ways.

But they also recognize that with future wars, as Brennan mentioned, the reliance on institutional trust in, in this future, as if the Chinese like to call it, you know, intelligentized, you know, conflict in the future, they recognize that might be a weakness that they can exploit.

And so right now, I mean, there are a lot of ways that the Chinese are already, you know, one upping us in the, you know, information domain. You look at the, honestly, the Chinese electronic warfare capabilities are arguably the best in the world right now. Well, when it comes to systems and numbers of forces and everything else, right? And, but they recognize that in future all domain operations that they don't need to win in every domain, they need to just be better in certain domains that negate the ability of other domains. I know it sounds weird, but it's very clear when we talk about things like, are the Chinese going to build up a conventional, powerful force that can go brigade against brigade against the US Army? Probably not. But they may not need to. Right. If they can, you know, defeat the US in the space domain and then maintain that information dominance, as they like to call it, that negates the US's ability to, you know, to effectively command and control in a lot of ways.

So, China is building up, you know, these space and cyber capabilities and, other, other methods to get after the cognitive domain, which is a whole other topic altogether, which, when you look at their own discussions about all-domain operations, they believe the Russians do really well, but the US is not effective in cognitive domain operations.

And so, they're going to continue to build those kinds of, I'm reluctant to use the word asymmetric capabilities because to me, it's not necessarily asymmetric. It's a matter of, you know, it's, everybody does it. And everybody has those same capabilities, but they're going to rely on those more to negate the US's advantages in the primary physical domains that they may feel weaker in.

[Brennan Deveraux] So I think that you brought a good point out, and we talk about it not just with China, but with Russia or anyone we're really facing. I think back to my time walking the streets in Iraq. The adversaries, as we look at us, the West as a whole, as you kind of the, the dominant force, someone doesn't need to create an asymmetric advantage on us. What they're doing is they're figuring out ways to take away our asymmetric advantages that we have and really forcing us to think about the problems differently. And I think China's been doing that well with the, you know, anti-access push.

But as we look at land warfare, I think that'll be an interesting conversation going forward on kind of how, we're easy, it's easy for us to say, here's how I think we're going to win. I think it'll be much harder for us to say here's how I think China's going to neutralize our advantages. Where can we try to overcome that and be creative and adaptive? So, I think that's a really good point for some potential future research.

[Joshua Arostegui] I love it.

[Rick Gunnell] I also liked how you mentioned in your monograph that the US Army is building relationships for strategic and operational value. And epitomizing that distinction were the US Army Security Force Assistance Brigades, where they're advising and assisting. And you listed some really interesting examples, including Mongolia, where they helped stand up an NCO education system; teaching Thai troops how to maneuver Stryker armored personnel carriers; and training Maldivian forces on how to operate drones for search and rescue missions. I find that all very specific and helpful as a force multiplier. So, with that, we'll go to the next question.

Given the excellent baseline you create, where do you hope to take this research next?

[Joshua Arostegui] Oh, man. So, this, the purpose behind this monograph was A) to answer, you know, US Army specific requests; but B) really to, as you mentioned, create kind of a foundational piece for the China Landpower Studies Center to continue to, you know, expand different research efforts with, you know, as I mentioned, things that we couldn't put in there like discussions about command and control and theater army.

I mean, the command control issue itself is an under-discussed topic amongst the China community of interest, especially with the army. The span of command and control is going to be a major problem for them in the future. And I think it's a great future topic for us. And then, you know, the all-domain operations concept is continually developing. You know, they've moved over the past 5 or 6 years they went from trying to figure out what domains actually could be defined, or how they could define domains. And they went from that to, hey, let's figure out how to do cross-domain strikes. And then they determined, hey, we're good with that. Now we gotta figure out how do we actually control, command and control these new domains. And so this is a continually evolving process that I think would be a great research effort for us.

And then, you know, getting after some of those leadership profiles. I think people, you know, don't understand. The army, the PLA Army dominates the force still. People like to talk about jointness in the PLA. Yes, they're working on it. But guess who holds most of the senior positions within the Central Military Commission and then the joint theater commands. That's the Army still. And I think it's worthwhile just defining how those general officers are being, you know, developed and trained and the like.

[Brennan Deveraux] Yeah. And I know Josh and his team really like to go in the weeds. And that's where their expertise is. And being able to read the language helps, I'm sure. But we're also keeping the band together.

Me and Josh are going to work on another project together this year. We're already underway, where we really take a big step back as well. And we're recruiting experts across the war college, a focus on the Strategic Studies Institute faculty. But taking a broader look at what a conflict with China could look like. Not the isolated regional conflict. In fact, I, the tentative title is Beyond a Regional Crisis forecasting China's posturing for a great power war. But this idea of if there is some sort of crisis in that regional conflict, and neither nation desires a vertical escalation to a full war, a nuclear, war, an invasion of either homeland, that, horizontal escalation, whether that be through, you know, conventional military means or, some other aspect of influence, is a lot more likely. And so we've partnered with some regional experts, as well as, with some Indo-Pacific experts to kind of peel this onion back, to use a modern right now problem to help us forecast what China might want to do to better position itself if that conflict were to take off.

I'm really excited about it. I think it'll be really good. And sadly, I think a lot of the readers will actually probably be from China as they go, hey, these are some great tips on maybe what we should start planning. But I think it'll be a valuable tool that really opens up the aperture beyond the, you know, big circle. We could draw around China and say, hey, here's the influential problem or the regional problem. But what does this mean for South America? You know, what does this mean for our forces in the Middle East or our, you know, grand strategy? So, something on us. So that's right where I'm trying to take it. Me and Josh are working on that project now, and, Rick, maybe we'll have a conversation with you about a year from now about that, if we can get it across the finish line.

[Joshua Arostegui] Oh, it'll get there. Especially with Brennan as a part of the team.

[Rick Gunnell] And, Brennan, you mentioned your time in Iraq. You just had a new book published. Congratulations. Did you want to just give a quick little plug and describe what that's about?

[Brennan Deveraux] Yeah. So, I just had my, it's a war memoir published called Exterminating ISIS: Behind the Curtain of a Technological War. It was about my 2016 deployment. I was also there in 2010, 2011, and it was a real personal story about sitting in this air-conditioned office, fighting the war over TV screens as I worked at the theater level, firing rockets. And it's a weird dynamic that we don't really talk about in warfare. But as we start talking about the transparent battlefield, the technological age, the primacy of strike, you know, over so much, I think, Operation Inherent Resolve was really that big first stepping stone. And so, I think it turned into a really good story. It's much more of a casual read for those that are comfortable with, you know, the military topics and somewhat aggressive, you know, stories. But I'm really happy with it. And, hoping it gets circulated.

[Rick Gunnell] I'm still waiting for my autograph.

[Joshua Arostegui] I got mine already.

[Rick Gunnell] Alright, well, I just want to thank you both for taking the time for this podcast. Final question. Are there any other projects that you're working on or books that you're reading or conferences that you're planning?

[Joshua Arostegui] Oh, I'll go with this one first. You know, the books I'm reading, unfortunately, are pretty dry when it comes to all my dissertation work right now, but, I will put a quick plug in for our own Carlisle Conference on the PLA that took place in 2024. Our conference volume should be coming out in the next few weeks. And so by the time this podcast, you know, publishes, it could be out already or pretty close to publication. And the topic is the 2024 conference and our theme was, assessing the PRC's, you know, views on and capabilities to carry out a protracted war in the Indo-Pacific. And we brought a lot of talented authors, and researchers to come, you know, basically discuss on a panel, on various panels, their research, but also author great chapters. And I think this will get a lot of hits and views when it gets published.

[Brennan Deveraux] Gotta get those downloads. So I've already talked pretty extensively about the project I'm really focused on for this next year. I'm also hoping to work again with some of the students here at the college on what we call an integrated research project. And we're going to look at China and Great Power War as well. But you're reading, question. I'm excited. I'm kind of between projects, having closed this one out and getting ready for my big projects going to the academic year, I've kind of been on the lookout for uniform wearers that, those big thinkers still in the service who are putting some stuff out.

I'm really excited about two books I came across. One, by Brian Groves, just published. It's called When Presidents Fight the Last War: The Oval Office, Sunk Costs, and Wartime Decision-Making Since Vietnam. I'm excited to check that out. And then, another one by another senior Army strategist, Nate Finney. It's an upcoming book called Orchestrating Power. I know once that releases, I'll probably pick that up as well.

[Joshua Arostegui] I'm looking forward to that one as well.

[Brennan Deveraux] So support the team and just see what others in uniform, the big thinkers of our time are talking about and thinking about.

[Rick Gunnell] Great. Thank you so much for your time today. Really enjoyed reading the monograph. Encourage others to read it. And listeners, you can learn more about the China Landpower Studies Center at ssi.armywarcollege.edu/clsc.

For more Army War College podcasts, please check out Conversations on Strategy, Decisive Point, SSI Live, and A Better Peace. With that, thank you.