This episode showcases the understudied institutional Army, the generating force, as a critical prerequisite for overall strategic success. Competition, crisis, and conflict require more than the manned, trained, and equipped units that deploy. This podcast analyzes six case studies of institutional Army reforms over 160 years to examine adaptation in peace and war. The conclusions provide historical insights to inform current practices and fulfill the Army’s articulated 2022 Institutional Strategy.

Read the source article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/14/

Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/10/2003316777/-1/-1/0/DP-PODCAST-TRANSCRIPT-BONIN-SCUDIERI-FINAL.PDF

Keywords: institutional Army, generating force, Department of the Army staff, Army Futures Command, adaptation, innovation

Crider

You’re listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/mod/67423/details/582).

The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Today, I'm talking with Dr. John A. Bonin and Dr. James D. Scudieri, authors of “Change and Innovation in the Institutional Army from 1860–2020,” (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/13/) which was published in the summer of 2023, issued of Parameters.

Bonin is a consultant and distinguished fellow at the US Army War College, and Scudieri is the senior research historian at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

Welcome to Decisive Point.

Bonin

Thank you.

Scudieri

Thank you for hosting us today, Stephanie.

Crider

Let's jump right in. Your article offers 6 case studies examining the institutional army from 1860 to 2020. Your examples review the keys to successful institutional reform and the pitfalls and setbacks that impede progress. Let's walk briefly through the case studies. What do we need to know about the Cavalry Bureau in the American Civil War?

Bonin

I'm the one that picked that one, and it's an interesting case study, for me, because it's one of the earliest we can point to that the Army was trying to actually innovate. They even used that word. Secretary of War (Edwin McMasters) Stanton was very concerned with the abuse of cavalry and the lack of Union success. The Confederates had gained calvary superiority early in the war with a better structural focus of their cavalry units. The Union was behind, so Stanton, Secretary of War, tried to take some bureaucratic innovations to solve the problem. He came up with the idea of the Cavalry Bureau, which combined pieces of the Quartermaster Bureau and the Ordnance Bureau in order to create a synergistic effect. This is very similar to our cross-functional teams today, which is what resonated with me as a useful case study.

After several false starts, Stanton appointed James H. Wilson, a brigadier general, to head the Bureau in January of ‘64. Within about four months, Wilson was able to reform the procurement of horses, acquire seven-shot repeating carbines for all cavalry forces, and reform the institutional training for calvary troops before they joined their horses. And in short order, the Union armies were able to gain cavalry superiority over the Confederates and ultimately led to success. Unfortunately, shortly after 1865, Calvary Bureau was disestablished, which is one of the lessons we've learned in our case studies.

Crider

What impact did the US Army circa 1898 to 1920 have on institutional reform?

Scudieri

I found that a fascinating case study. First, it covers almost a quarter century, so those years are trying to learn post-war lessons after the Spanish-American War. It's trying to identify what changes are necessary in peacetime based on all of the changes going on in terms of the characteristics of warfare, through western warfare. The Europeans are trying to figure this out, as well. And then specifically for the US Army, there's major wartime adaptation as America becomes involved in the First World War.

There are lots of personalities involved here, but there's also a lot of personnel turmoil because there are several chiefs of staff who go through the leadership of the Army during this particular period, and also on the civilian leadership, two secretaries of war. Especially well-known would be Elihu Root, and then less well-known is Newton Baker, who wound up becoming a wartime secretary, which I don't think was originally his plan.

We also have the same issue as John talked about, wartime reform after the Spanish-American War, peacetime changes, which affect in many ways the front-office access on how many different entities in the Army could walk directly in to see the chief, and then wartime adaptation to get through the First World War. And get through the First World War, in this case, means not just forming the divisions that go to France under Pershing but the Army that's back home, this institutional army, especially the general staff. Unfortunately, one of those areas that did not resolve itself too well was the contest between Pershing and his headquarters in France and the institutional army, especially the general staff back home. And then, after the war, there's this major demobilization followed by, again, as John pointed out, some of the lessons are not learned permanently.

Crider

Your subsequent case study is General Marshall and an army headquarters for World War II. What is most important from this study?

Scudieri

Well, one could look at this case study almost as a sequel to the one I just discussed in the sense that in both cases, especially the end of the first one and now pretty much for most of this one, the Army has to adapt institutionally to what we would now call large-scale combat operations.

And World War II will be even bigger than America's involvement in the First World War, but this is also an analysis of the institution. That Marshall, before the war starts, he's got too many hats to wear, too many people that he has to help, assist, monitor, manage. And so, part of that reorganization is what I

call the triple hat of he can now delegate and deal directly with Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, and the Army Air Forces instead of the multitude he had before. These are the entities that will wind up providing the 89 divisions the Army has in the Second World War.

Crider

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and U.S. Army Combat developments. What are the takeaways from this example?

Bonin

Following on what we were just discussing, these other reforms, the Army had reverted back to essentially a Bureau and a technical service system that had been existent since 1860. McNamara comes in as Secretary of Defense and wants to reform DoD, so he's the really first activist Secretary of Defense. We hadn't had that before. So, he does a couple of things. He creates defense entities: Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Logistics Agency, but he looks inside the Army and doesn't like what he sees. And so, he wants to see more focus on combat developments, is the term, and so he forces the Army to create a Combat Developments Command and an Army Material Command.

[He] takes the power away from these bureaus that had been contested in 1860, puts it under Army material command. And it keeps a combat developments command to focus on developing new techniques, new procedures, new doctrine, new concepts rather than leaving those back under the individual branches and uncoordinated. That immediately leads to the Army's focus on Army aviation, which I did my dissertation on, so I think this is a very interesting case of which the external SecDef (Secretary of Defense) had to force the Army to embrace Army aviation.

It did not come necessarily from within without his forcing function. So, he creates a test division, resources it, that test division then becomes the First Cav Division which is then deployed almost immediately to Vietnam. McNamara believed Army aviation was the key to success in Vietnam. I'm not so sure he was right, but he did force the Army to embrace aviation. And that's one of the lessons of this is that sometimes it takes an external civilian leader to force the changing function inside the US military.

Crider

Tell me about General Creighton William Abrams Jr's 1973 reorganization.

Bonin

Well, this comes at the end of the Vietnam War, so this is not a war-time adaptation and, as I mentioned, McNamara is prewar, but he was anticipating a war. So now we're through the Vietnam War and now we have a new strategic environment. The draft is over, the volunteer Army is in place, the army is shrinking by over 50 percent, and Creighton Abrams is concerned that we entered the Vietnam War poorly trained. So, he's got a training concept and he's aided by General Depuy. Depuy was an advocate for training. So Depuy is the key subordinate that helps him guide this reorganization, and he's going to take the Continental Army Command, which had become huge—too many missions, too many focuses—and he wants to split it into the Forces Command that handles forces and the Training and Doctrine Command, which handles training and doctrine.

But a casualty of this reorganization was the combat developments command that had previously been created by the Secretary McNamara, Combat Development Command then gets subsumed under TRADOC, and ultimately, we’ll find that the future focused mission of the Combat Developments Command is lost, which leads us to another innovation.

Crider

Army Futures Command, what do we need to know?

Scudieri

In a sense, the Army Futures Command case study is the hardest of all because we're living it now. I'm not sure people appreciate the sheer boldness of this initiative in our lifetime to establish a new headquarters with a new Army four star and to understand the sheer scope and breadth of what Army Futures Command is trying to accomplish.

There's a lot of focus on its technical aspects; there's a lot of focus on its attempts to help the material acquisition arena, but their missions go well beyond those particular arenas. They are involved in a mindset change of culture, for the adaptation and innovation has to cut across more than just the technical. So, to coin the old term and the adage, the jury is still out, but we should appreciate the sheer boldness of that move to establish that command in 2018.

Crider

We really covered a lot here. Could you pull it together for us? What conclusions can we draw from these case studies?

Scudieri

First, I'd like to point out is the role of history to gain insights—I prefer the word insights versus lessons learned. History informs the present, which will influence the future, and these case studies highlight the balance between continuity and change. A particular aspect of continuity and change are the personalities involved. These case studies highlight the involvement of Army senior leaders, civilian and military, but also how they worked with the executive branch, the president, and also with Congress to accomplish that change. There are success stories; there are not success stories. As John has pointed out, still having to deal with the Bureau system is an example of a very persistent, entrenched bureaucracy. But I think it also highlights that in many ways, you have different visions of how the Army should progress and what the Army's vision and future is.

Bonin

Innovation is hard. It takes a lot of leadership. It takes a lot of vision, and it also takes some continuity, as Jim alluded to. Some of the leaders had to remain in position for a number of years in order to ensure some of this innovation and change occurred. When some of the leaders left, some of that impetus, some of that enthusiasm could decline. So, the other lesson—if you will, insight—that you can get from these six case studies is the Army does innovate, but it's hard, and it takes key leaders and a lot of buy-in by subordinates to ultimately succeed.

Crider Thank you. Listeners, you can read the entire article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 2. Thank you so much; this was a real pleasure.

Bonin

Thank you, Steph.

Crider

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