The US military, intelligence, and diplomatic communities have overlooked a key vulnerability in their assessment of a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan—Taiwan’s growing reliance on agricultural imports and its food stocks (except for rice) that could endure trade disruptions for only six months. This podcast assesses Taiwan’s agricultural sector and its ability to feed the country’s population if food imports and production are disrupted; identifies the food products that should be prioritized in resupply operations, based on Taiwan’s nutritional needs and domestic food production; and outlines the required logistical assets. These findings underscore the urgency for US military planners to develop long-term logistical solutions for this complex strategic issue.

Read the article: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol53/iss2/10/

Keywords: Decisive Point Podcast, China, resiliency, Taiwan, food insecurity, naval blockade

Episode Transcript: “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China”

Stephanie Crider (Host)

You’re listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.

Today, I’m chatting with Captain Gustavo Ferreira and Major Jamie Critelli, authors of “Taiwan’s Food Resiliency—or Not—in a Conflict with China.” Ferreira is a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer at the 353 Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. Critelli, US Army Reserves, is a civil affairs officer serving as an agricultural officer in the 353 Civil Affairs Command. He’s a seasonal farm business owner and has worked globally in agriculture on five continents.

Welcome back to Decisive Point, gentlemen.

Jamie Critelli

Thank you for having us here, Stephanie.

Gustavo Ferreira

Thank you, Stephanie. Happy to be here.

Host

Your article . . . it focuses on Taiwan’s food resiliency. Please give us an overview of Taiwan’s agricultural sector.

Ferreira

I would like to start by emphasizing how recent supply chain disruptions, crop failures in some key producing countries, as well as the war in Ukraine, have pushed global food prices to record high levels and also reminded many countries about the risks associated with the dependency on food imports to feed their populations. In the case of Taiwan, as this country industrialized its economy and developed key manufacturing sectors such as the semiconductor sector, its agricultural production had been declining for decades. As a result, Taiwan’s ability to feed itself has decreased, and food imports now cover about 2/3s of its annual caloric intake. What’s problematic with this is that contrary to what we’ve seen in Ukraine(where the) United States and other NATO allies are being able to supply Ukraine with massive amounts of supplies through a vast shared land border. A similar effort will not be possible for Taiwan because of A). Taiwan being an island and B). China’s Liberation Army Navy and Rocket Force have now the capabilities of denying freedom of movement to any adversary naval force in the air. In the context of a conflict with China; it will be extremely difficult and risky for cargo ships and airlift to reach Taiwan.

Another challenge will be the fact that China will likely attempt to capture major operational ports to use them to dock their own merchant civilian ships to supply its invasion of Taiwan. As a response, the Taiwanese military will almost certainly try to deny China’s access to these ports via obstacles such as sea mines or sunken ships. With all main ports no longer operational, we believe the United States and its allies will struggle to transport and unload critical food supplies to Taiwan.

Nevertheless, it’s important to note that Taiwanese authorities are well aware of these vulnerabilities, and the build-up of public food stocks have been a central component of the country’s food resiliency strategy. And I’ll give an example, during the COVID-19 crisis the Taiwanese government shared that the population that the nation had enough Food and Agriculture commodity stocks to handle disruptions in agriculture trade for six months. That was their promise. Our own analysis also shows that Taiwan has enough food reserves to feed its population for about six months. After that, the island will have to import food products to meet its nutritional needs.

Host

In the event of a naval blockade enforced by China, which food products should be prioritized in early stock build-up efforts or resupply operations based on Taiwan’s nutritional needs and domestic food production?

Critelli

Taiwan, population 23 million, is actually the 16th largest food-importing country in the world. As you heard from Gus, it’s heavily reliant upon food imports to meet its needs, and certainly, any naval blockade will disrupt these flows. Food products must be prioritized in any efforts to build up stockages pre-conflict and should be included in US and allied resupply operations during a conflict.

Specific food products we consider are prioritized based upon two factors. First is widespread consumption of the food product already by the Taiwanese population, so we know that they eat it. And number two, a large volume of Taiwan imports due to the inability of domestic production to meet the demand nationally. When we look at the food that the Taiwanese are eating, about 50 percent of the calories come from grains. A large chunk of this is covered by domestic rice production, so we can exclude that, but wheat, corn, and soy are almost completely imported to meet the needs because there is no domestic production. In fact, the imports of wheat, corn, and soy amount to some 9 million metric tons annually. Wheat is used for them to produce flour, while corn and soy are almost exclusively used as livestock feed, predominantly for poultry and hogs. Next up on the list would be animal protein, 50 years ago, the average Taiwanese citizen derived 75 percent of their protein needs from plant sources and 25 percent from animal sources. The new mix is now nearly 50/50. A third of this animal protein comes from fish. The grains that I mentioned earlier are used to feed poultry and hogs. There is barely a domestic beef sector in Taiwan, so all beef is imported. With fish, however, the coastal and deep sea fishing industries provide it, but in the event of any naval action, these industries will be limited as well. So to produce fish, it will need to move on to shore into aquaculture facilities. Both fish and chicken are remarkable at transforming their rations into protein and should be prioritized in production to reduce the grain import needed to provide protein sources to the population in the first place.

Finally, while it isn’t a food stuff, do not forget about chemical inputs. These would include fertilizers and pesticides needed to grow plants as well as any chemical inputs and antibiotics needed for increased levels of dry land aquaculture. Despite whether the country needs to transition to a higher level of domestic production or it needs to start eating lower on the food pyramid due to a naval embargo, it will still need the means of sustaining itself with increased domestic agriculture.

Host

What logistical assets would be required to strengthen Taiwan’s food resiliency?

Ferreira

In this study, we developed three scenarios that assess the ability of Taiwan’s food system to endure a partial or a total Chinese Navy blockade. These scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive.

We started with scenario number one, which assumes that China effectively denies US and Allied food resupply operations. So, in other words, Taiwan becomes completely cut off from the rest of the world. Under this scenario, Taiwan will not be able to get external assistance. They will need to have sufficient food supplies at hand right at the beginning of the conflict. This is because while the current food stock levels may sustain Taiwan for six months, they will be insufficient in the event of a much more prolonged naval block. And let’s not forget it has been a year and two months since Russia invaded Ukraine, so nothing is certain about how long any military operation will last. So Taiwan will be better off being prepared for a longer-term scenario. To do so, we proposed two particular strategies. The first one is to increase its food reserve levels, and the second one is to increase its domestic food production. But we gotta say that, unfortunately, these two options also come with their own challenges and limitations, and we’ll cover those in a minute.

Starting with the first one, increasing food reserve levels for that, Taiwan will have to make major investments in storage capacity and strengthen its strategic stockpiles of key materials to include foodstuff. The problem here is the large storage facilities, and you can think of grain silos or cold storage warehouses; they’re also very vulnerable targets. Therefore, you know, Taiwan’s military will have to, at the same time as they build this infrastructure, they will also have to think about developing protective systems to defend this critical infrastructure from either kinetic or cyber attacks. The second option, which will be to increase domestic food production in order to make Taiwan more resilient, will come with also some problems.

So first, in order to boost more traditional agricultural production, that will take time, and it will require significant changes in the country’s rather antiquated agricultural system. The other thing is the island will be also capped by its limited farmland and agricultural labor, so if we want to go the traditional route, there are those limitations.

We propose to circumvent those constraints that Taiwanese authorities consider two options. The first is to develop a victory garden program. Back in World War I and World War II, the US developed this program, and just as an example, by the end of 1944, about 20 million victory gardens in the United States accounted for large shares of the country’s total annual fruits and vegetable production. So they were instrumental in maintaining food security during a major conflict. The second strategy will be well placed for a country that is as densely populated as Taiwan. And this would be the use of hydroponics which will allow many households to produce leafy greens within their own houses. There are some issues here, too. Hydroponic vegetable production has a steep learning curve and also requires considerable upfront investments. While these new surpluses will be dispersed throughout the country and, therefore more resilient to Chinese attack. They’ll also only partially mitigate the problem, and this is because they will produce food categories in where Taiwan’s already highly sufficient, and that’s vegetables, fruits, and roots. Nevertheless, it will provide some relief to the population, at least in the short run.

The second scenario contemplates the United States and its allies, anticipating that they can sustain limited resupply operations to Taiwan, even within the context of a Chinese naval embargo. And the rationale for this, we think along the lines of what’s happening currently at the Black Sea and Ukraine and Russia. So Ukraine and Russia agreed on the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which has kept critical grain corridors open to international buyers. We think that China could also allow limited maritime traffic to bring essential food products to Taiwan in order to avoid a major humanitarian crisis. So under this scenario, however, it’s unclear whether commercial shipping companies will be willing to operate (in) that region. And that’s due to the elevated risk and high operational costs. Think about really prohibitive insurance rates and even the difficulty obtaining things such as shipping letters of credit. In that case, the US and allied navies may need to ensure the arrival of critical food supplies to Taiwan using their own logistical assets. This raises another question, (which) is whether the US military and the Allies can replace those commercial operations.

And this is because this will include all different classes of shipping vessels to bring bulk cargo and containers and ranging from small vessels to very large ones. So think about what it would take to bring the volume of soybeans imported by Taiwan in 2021, which amounts to 2.6 million metric tons. So that will require about 47 Panamax-sized vessels. This is the largest ship that can cross the locks of the Panama Canal. Because of such large import volumes, that also will rule out completely a Berlin Airlift-type of operation, especially if China contests the airspace surrounding Taiwan.

Still, under this scenario, other logistical considerations include, that most agricultural imports arrive to Taiwan through four main ports. So it would be essential for those ports to stay operational and even to expand their capacities to sustain full supplier operations. Another issue is that about 90 percent of agriculture imports that arrive to Taiwan come through sea routes, and out of that, 85 percent comes through shipping containers. So why is this important? Taiwan’s heavy reliance on shipping containers is a vulnerability because China is the world’s top producer and exporter of shipping containers. The recent supply chain disruptions during COVID highlighted that issue.

The last scenario looks at the situation where the United States and allies foresee an impending Chinese naval blockade and begin to quickly coordinate food resupply operations before the blockade is in force. In this situation, it will involve the United States first anticipating the imminent invasion and naval blockade, and then we’ll have a limited window of opportunity to start resupply operations and try to bring as many foodstuffs as possible before maritime traffic to the islands is completely disrupted. Because time is essential, it will be challenging for allies to contract and mobilize the additional civilian maritime and military maritime transportation assets that can quickly bring the additional food supplies before the conflict begins. Also, in that situation, like Major Critelli mentioned, the United States and allies will have to prioritize transportation of certain food products, those should be upfront in those operations before that window is closed.

Finally, on the receiving end, Taiwan would need to have sufficient infrastructure and the supply chain channels to receive, absorb, store, and distribute the sudden spike in imports of such large volumes of food commodities. Otherwise, what might happen is that the food products make it to the island, but they end up getting spoiled or go waste due to waiting longer periods at the shore or improper handling, or inadequate storage capacity.

Host

What conclusions can we draw from this?

Critelli

The global focus at the moment is on Ukraine and the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the relative food insecurity of several countries around the world appearing as a result, but we can also draw lessons from that conflict that would apply to a potential conflict involving Taiwan. Ukraine is a major global food exporter, so the bulk of impacts are felt outside of Ukraine. Taiwan as a major food importer, will feel the impact inside the country. Taiwan focused on economic development instead of focusing on ag development, so the global impacts we will feel in the event of a Taiwan embargo, would be felt downstream. Globally, they would be felt within the supply chains of semiconductors, for example in other items, and there would be third order impacts appearing elsewhere that we haven’t even thought about.

As Gustavo mentioned, Taiwan is very different from Ukraine due to its geography. So in many cases the response in the event of a conflict must be very different as well. We must consider novel approaches to ensuring Taiwan can meet its nutritional needs over a long time horizon. We must look at Taiwan strengths and weaknesses and see how we can pivot a weakness into an opportunity to meet their needs based on what they already do well. We, therefore, propose more aquaculture and hydroponics and more of a closed-loop production network with local production as much as possible. We can reduce the impact of an invasion by drastically reducing dependency on imports. We must do everything we can to prevent a conflict from happening in the first place. A war in this part of the world, involving the countries who could be parties to it would be absolutely catastrophic. NATO doesn’t exist in the Pacific. We need to pursue a diplomatic approach with a group of nations to best position Taiwan to prevent or to speedily deescalate emerging conflict.

Ferreira

As we got deeper in our research, it became really clear that US and allied efforts to break the blockade will very likely be unsuccessful or difficult at best, and in this matter, China could endure the consequences of a prolonged confrontation much better than Taiwan could. And going back to what Major Critelli said, the time to prepare is now, in order to increase that resiliency to the island.

Host

Thank you so much for making time to speak with me today.

Ferreira

Thank you, Stephanie, for giving us the opportunity to talk about our paper.

Critelli

Thank you for having us, Stephanie.

Host

Listeners, you can read the article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 53, issue 2.

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About the authors:

Captain Gustavo F. Ferreira is a senior agricultural economist with the US Department of Agriculture and serves as an agricultural officer (38G) at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserves. He holds a PhD in agricultural economics from Louisiana State University, and prior to joining the federal government, he was an assistant professor in agricultural economics at Virginia Tech University. He has published numerous research articles in top-ranking economics and military journals.

Major Jamie A. Critelli, US Army Reserve, is a Civil Affairs officer serving as an agricultural officer in the 353rd Civil Affairs Command. He is a seasonal farm business owner and has worked in agriculture on five continents. He also serves as the director of the Operational Excellence Department at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. He graduated with honors from Cornell University with a degree in horticulture and holds an MBA in supply-chain management from ETH Zurich.